Standing Committee B

[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]

Export Control

Nigel Griffiths: On a point of order, Mr. Benton. I should like to make a short statement to the Committee.First, Mr. Benton, I welcome you to the Chair. I also welcome the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) to the Committee. The hon. Member for South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Page) played a constructive part in our deliberations of this important Bill, as have all hon. Members, and I know that the hon. Member for Salisbury, too, will make a valuable contribution to our debates.
 This vital Bill has taken on added significance in the light of recent tragic events in America. Indeed, combating terrorism is one of the purposes for which we impose export controls, a fact that is made explicit in the schedule to the Bill. The other core aims of the Bill are as follows. First, it makes provision for greater democratic accountability by setting out in legislation the purposes for which export controls may be imposed, and by providing parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation made under the Bill. Secondly, it increases transparency by legally requiring Ministers to publish an annual report on export controls. Thirdly, it introduces powers to create a new licensing regime for arms trafficking and brokering, and to control the provision of technical assistance to weapons of mass destruction or related missile programmes. In summary, it modernises legislation dating back to 1939, and gives us an arms control regime fit for the 21st century and the challenges that we now face. 
 I also draw the Committee's attention to the fact that I shall be answering a written parliamentary question on the Bill today. In my reply, I discuss the dummy orders that the Department of Trade and Industry published earlier this month. The DTI has received numerous representations from the Quadripartite Committee, industry and non-governmental organisations, all seeking an opportunity to comment on secondary legislation to be made under the Bill. 
 Over the summer, I have been conscious that it is only right and proper that Parliament should be the first to see the draft dummy orders. We will need to discuss implementation of changes with all interested parties, especially those who will be most affected by those changes—preferably in the spring, at or near the time of Royal Assent. Although debates on primary legislation are an excellent forum for discussion of the Bill and of Government decisions on matters of principle, that is not the logical way to discuss the detail of secondary legislation. 
 For all those reasons, I am delighted to announce that we intend to hold a full public consultation on drafts of the orders that will be made following enactment of the Bill. That public consultation will give all interested parties an opportunity to comment on the details of the proposed secondary legislation. I know that the Committee will agree that providing an opportunity for the secondary legislation to be scrutinised in detail by public consultation will be of benefit to all, including Members of the House. 
 I shall ensure that copies of the written question and my reply are made available to the Committee by placing them on the Table as soon as possible.

Robert Key: Further to that point of order, Mr. Benton. First, may I say what an unexpected pleasure it is to serve once again under your chairmanship. I very much look forward to it, and to my new role as Opposition spokesman. You will not be surprised to hear that I have had to do quite a lot of homework. I also thank the Minister for his courteous welcome. I am sure that we shall find our deliberations constructive. I am delighted to have received copies of the dummy orders, and I thank the Minister for writing to me at the end of last week.
 Industry has missed a trick. Companies seem to think that the negative and affirmative procedures under which the secondary legislation will be considered in detail will be a grand opportunity for debate in the House. Of course it will not be, which is why I warmly welcome the consultation period announced by the Minister. Industry will need to engage in that consultation, because although it accepts the provisions, some parts, such as the machine tool industry, regard them as merely a tidying-up operation. However, there are still fundamental issues to be debated and they are covered in some of the important and, indeed, long and complex statutory instruments before us. 
 I got a surprise when, during my homework, I went through the Quadripartite Committee report of 1 May on the draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill. On 25 April, the Chairman of the Committee queried why the Government had chosen the negative procedure, as opposed to the affirmative one that is used in so much of the present Bill. The then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry said: 
 ``My own view is that provided there is the opportunity for Parliament to deal with these matters then there will be an opportunity if the House feels strongly about a matter then certainly in my experience, whether it is negative or affirmative, then the way can be found for the matter to be dealt with. That is the way in practice that these things happen.'' 
Oh, I wish that were true. Parliamentarians know—I fear that British industry does not—that debates on affirmative and negative procedures are very short and not substantive. The consultation period will therefore be vital for all those involved in export industries to make clear their position on the complex matters involved. 
 That said, I am grateful to the Minister for his courtesy and I look forward to proceeding constructively on the Bill.

Jenny Tonge: I add my welcome to the secondary legislation. I thought that it would be dumped on us and that we would have to read, learn and inwardly digest it in 24 hours. The consultation period is welcome and we thank the Minister for it.
 I also welcome the continuation of the Committee's proceedings. It is remarkable that we are continuing and that nothing has changed in the light of present circumstances. 
 For many years during my parliamentary career I have wanted arms control in particular to be tightened. It is worth reflecting on the fact that the terrorists actions of 11 September were carried out with the aid of Stanley knives, not guns. That raises a point that the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) is always making. We must bear that in mind during our deliberations. I welcome the resumption of the Committee's proceedings and I hope that all goes well.

Clause 2 - Purposes of orders under section 1(1) or 2(1)

Robert Key: I beg to move amendment No. 48, in page 2, line 21, after second `transfer', insert `other than within a company or group'.
 Under the current legislation, only the physical export of defence equipment is regulated. Controls on the transfer of dual-use technology were introduced in September 2000 when the revised European Community dual-use item regulation came into force. It is reasonable that the Government should propose to close the loophole in the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939. However, controls on the transfer of technology by intangible means need to be clearly defined to avoid damaging the competitiveness of the UK defence industry. 
 The Bill takes little or no account of the globalisation of the defence industry or the increasingly multinational character of defence companies. It is important to recognise that defence manufacturers do not oppose the idea of the Bill covering electronic communications; it is an anomaly that they have not been covered. However, they are concerned about how the provisions will work in practice. 
 The reality of the defence industry has not been fully recognised. For example, fast and efficient access to and exchange of information is essential for multinational companies and for any collaborative programmes. I recall—it seems like yesterday—the scenes on the doorsteps of various chancelleries and Prime Ministers' residencies, when the Government tried to persuade the German and French Governments to move towards a more together defence industry for Europe. All sorts of mergers were proposed and sounded out, but various companies blasted them out of the water and they did not get as far as some people might have wished. If those companies had got together and formed one company, they would still have been caught by the Bill, as existing companies might if, for example, a United Kingdom-based engineer in a UK company wanted to make a telephone call to another engineer on a collaborative project in another country—a friendly ally. Would that call require an export licence or could it be covered in some way? 
 In my local pub in Salisbury over the weekend I happened to meet a person who worked for QinetiQ, the privatised part of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency. He recalled that things were easy for him and his colleagues when they were civil servants at DERA; they would not have thought for a moment about whether an export licence was needed to make a telephone call to Lockheed Martin, Airbus or anyone else. Now that they are in the private sector, they have to think all the time about what is on their computers and whether they should be in rooms for meetings. He said, ``We didn't realise that the private sector had to behave like that.'' 
 Everyone now has to tackle that cultural change. My amendment simply attempts to clarify what the Government mean. We want to know whether the Government really intend that someone in a company or group on one project could find himself in trouble if he did not have an export licence every time he sent an e-mail from one part of the group or joint project to another. That cannot be the Government's intention, but that is what the Bill says, as I and industry read it. The Government cannot intend to impose such strict regulations and bureaucratic controls on UK companies that our manufacturing industry will become known throughout the world as an especially difficult partner. I hope that the Minister will allay those fears. 
 It is far more sensible to allow the free flow of information within companies, and to require export licences for information that will go outside a company, group of companies or a collaborative project sanctioned by Governments. That is the purpose of the amendment. It does not seek to exempt swathes of British industry from reasonable surveillance or permissions, but to ensure that the burden placed on them does not make them hopelessly uncompetitive. That would not be to the advantage of anyone.

Gerald Howarth: I welcome you back to the Committee, Mr. Benton, and I thank the Minister for providing us with dummy orders. I am delighted to know that there will be a consultation period, because someone in industry to whom I spoke this morning told me that he and his colleagues would be closeted with their lawyers for a month, pouring over the detailed legislation to understand the full implications of the dummy orders for them.
 May I be permitted to single something out in passing, Mr. Benton? I was interested, as you may be, in the definition of a robot, which is: 
 ``A manipulation mechanism, which may be of the continuous path or of the point-to-point variety,'' 
and ``may use `sensors'''. There is a variety of descriptions, but there is an exception for robots that are 
 ``Mechanically controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to'' 
programs in which the motions are mechanically 
``limited by fixed, but adjustable, stops such as pins or cams'' 
and in which 
 ``The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are variable within the fixed program patterns.'' 
Clearly that is a reference to the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions. I am sure that he will find the dummy orders as interesting to peruse as we have done. 
 I welcome the consultation period. If the industry takes longer than 12 weeks, I hope that the Minister will be flexible. 
 I strongly endorse the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury on the amendment. Like him, I have associations with QinetiQ. Its name presumably has something to do with physics. The people in QinetiQ have operated under a very different system, called the Ministry of Defence form 680 procedure. Under that system, if they wish to discuss restricted matters with somebody in another country, they have to obtain permission. They have been able to work with that, and it is an established procedure with an element of flexibility. 
 I entirely understand my hon. Friend's point that those people who prior to 1 July were part of DERA frequently held discussions with their counterparts, and those in Defence Science and Technology Laboratories—the remaining public sector defence research establishment—will continue to have discussions about sensitive matters with the United States in particular, but also with our allies elsewhere. It is important that the Bill does not obstruct the sharing of important information among scientists who are trying to develop defence equipment for the protection of our own people. It would be a paradox if, at the same time as we are looking for co-operation on a broad scale to defeat terrorism, we were to place in the path of industry and the scientific community impediments to their ability to work together to make the world a safer place. The United Kingdom is a world leader in this area, so we must be careful how we deal with the matter. 
 This country is participating in a number of joint projects. For example, as part of the joint strike fighter project, BAE Systems is involved in both the Boeing project and the Lockheed Martin project in the United States. We need specific assurances that there will be no attempt, either by the state authorities such as the Crown Prosecution Service or by others seeking to move the law, to inhibit the efficient and proper consultation that must take place among people in this country and people in the United States on one of the most important military projects on the drawing board. 
 That applies not only to our relations with the United States, but to our relations with our continental partners as well. The Typhoon—formerly and unfortunately known as the Eurofighter, but now with a much better name—is a project being conducted by the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain. Clearly, an exchange of information is necessary for that project. I hope that the Minister can assure us that the Bill is not intended to catch the transmission of information such as my hon. Friend referred to—in particular, oral communications by telephone or communication by e-mail or fax. If the Bill were to do so, it would seriously inhibit the ability of defence manufacturers to work on important joint projects across national boundaries. Future projects may involve the United Kingdom in partnerships not just with the United States or other EU member states, but with countries such as Singapore or Australia or elsewhere where there are not exemptions for EU member states.The point made by my hon. Friend is important. 
 Thales is another instance relevant to the United Kingdom. It was formerly known as—

Robert Key: Thomson-CSF.

Gerald Howarth: I thank my hon. Friend--I was just checking. Thomson-CSF and Racal are now known as Thales, and my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Freeman is chairman of the British end of that important company. Like BAE Systems it has offices around the world. It is a French-owned company operating in the United Kingdom. Will it fall foul of the Bill if there are normal on-going discussions between various units of Thales, such as the United Kingdom element and the headquarters in Paris?
 It is a sensible suggestion that the words 
``other than within a company or group'' 
should be added to the clause, and perhaps we should also add the words ``or where companies are working together on a joint international project''. Whatever the merits of the Bill—and I quite understand that it has its merits—none of us would want so to hobble British industry, and particularly our defence industries, that they were unable efficiently and effectively to contribute to the defence of the United Kingdom and of freedom in the wider world.

Vincent Cable: We welcome the spirit behind clause 2. It is obviously necessary to exercise control over software as well as hardware if the objectives of the Bill are to be achieved. The transmission of technology, and the means of transmission—fax and telephone—must be part of that.

Joe Benton: Order. Is the hon. Gentleman speaking to the amendment? It sounds as if he is on clause stand part.

Vincent Cable: I was putting my remarks in the context of the clause.
 I understand the basic point made by the hon. Member for Salisbury that the structure of industry is changing and globalising. That is important, and creates a need for tighter control as well as for an understanding of how the industry functions. In the old days, a company like BAE systems would have been an old-fashioned British company with a large labour force, lifetime employment, internal cohesion, conditions of confidentiality and so on. That was the old way of doing things and it probably made it rather easy to exercise control over the inappropriate dissemination of technology. 
 The more fluid structure described by the hon. Gentleman, with lots of subcontracting, a small core management team and overseas alliances that come and go, undoubtedly makes businesses more efficient. However, it also creates plenty of opportunities for the transmission of technology to countries that should not have it and where there are genuine problems of end use. That is why we support the clause in its unamended form. The amendment would weaken the spirit of the clause. 
 A separate concern, which may or may not be dealt with by the amendment, is that of the universities about how far proper academic discourse can be allowed under the Bill. I do not think that the amendment is specifically directed at those concerns, but perhaps the Minister could explain how, in the Government's view, the universities' concerns are being taken care of. Perhaps he will need to prepare some amendments of his own that set out how information that is in the public domain and of a genuinely academic nature can properly be protected. I realise that that is not the objective of the amendment, but it is relevant to the discussion and I hope that the Minister can respond. 
 I apologise for not being able to stay for the Minister's reply, but I am on the Speaker's list to participate in another debate at 11 o'clock.

Rob Marris: I understand the concerns of the hon. Members for Salisbury and for Aldershot, but I think that the amendment is opaque and misconceived. It is opaque because it does not describe what ``group'' means, unless it is defined later and I have not seen it. For example, a group of companies may have encompassed Iraq in the mid 1980s, and if the amendment were agreed, we would not be able to stop the transfer of technology there. The amendment is misconceived in that the fifth word in line 18 on page 1 of the Bill is ``may''. That is permissive, not mandatory.

Kevan Jones: I have sympathy with the concerns of the hon. Member for Aldershot, because there have been worries about arrangements made by some companies—for example, Swan Hunter in the north-east, which is now Dutch-owned. We need reassurance from the Minister that these companies are now clearly international and pan-European. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) that the amendment does not cover this issue because it mentions a group. I am not sure how ``group'' is defined, because a lot of defence contracts these days are made by consortia of different companies and groups. Industry needs reassurance on the matter because the clause does not, in its present form, answer its concerns. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

Nigel Griffiths: I thank the hon. Member for Salisbury and other hon. Members for their kind words of welcome to the developments on the Government side since the recess began, and for the dummy orders which hon. Members have clearly studied in detail.
 I shall go through the points that have been raised and explain why I shall urge the Committee to resist this amendment. The hon. Member for Aldershot raised an important point, and he illustrated it with examples such as QinetiQ and Thales, expanding our lexicography if confusing our spelling. Industry will be able to apply for licences to cover a single or joint project or groups within a company for intra-company transfers and for industry partnerships. I heard with concern what my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones) said, and I hope that that goes some way to reassuring him also. The planned public consultation will provide a further opportunity to take into account the views of those affected by the new controls. Naturally, the Government will make every effort to fine tune the controls to meet any concerns expressed so far as is possible within the bounds of agreed Government policy. I am pleased to announce that the Export Control Organisation will be carrying out an awareness and education programme in the run-up to the introduction of new controls. We aim to work together with exporters to ensure that the transition to the new export control regime is as smooth and effective as possible.

Gerald Howarth: Perhaps it would be useful for the Minister to suggest to the Export Control Organisation that it consult the Defence Export Services Organisation, because I gather that the MOD form 680 procedure is largely governed by DESO. It therefore has a wealth of experience in this respect. If the orders are to be made workable and cause the least possible encumbrance for industry, DESO can perhaps give some advice to the organisation that the Minister mentioned.

Nigel Griffiths: I am sure that we and our associated bodies will welcome advice from anyone with expertise in the field.
 The hon. Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable) raised two important points. My officials have had a valuable meeting with the universities, which, I believe, are now satisfied that we shall be able to work together to ensure that academic freedoms are respected while proper controls are enforced. I know that that will be conveyed to the hon. Gentleman. We also intend that the existing open and individual licences for transfers of military technology will be automatically extended to cover the transfer of the same technology electronically. 
 The amendment would ensure that transfers of technology within one company or group could not be subject to control. The Government firmly believe that the power to control the transfer of technology within one company is essential to the effective operation of our export control regime. If transfers within one company were excluded from control, an unscrupulous exporter or individual could transfer sensitive technology simply by setting up a company with offices overseas. I am sure that members of the Committee agree that that would amount to an unacceptable loophole in our controls. 
 I can allay the fears of the hon. Member for Aldershot. I am confident that the continued use of open licensing will enable transparency to continue and red tape to be reduced. 
 My hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West highlighted the fact that the amendment would create problems by generating loopholes. 
 In view of those arguments, I hope that the hon. Member for Salisbury will withdraw his amendment.

Robert Key: I am grateful to the Minister for his considered view of the amendment. I listened with great interest to the contributions from both sides of the Committee. The most important thing that the Minister did was to give an assurance that companies would be able to apply for licences for joint or group actions and that intra-company transfers and partnerships would be handled sensitively. That satisfies the main purpose of the amendment, which is to tease out the issues. There was agreement on both sides of the Committee that it was necessary to seek clarification from the Government.
 I am relieved to hear about the meeting with the universities, and I am delighted that they are happier than they were. I am glad that the Export Control Organisation will carry out its important awareness exercise. Hon. Members tend to think that the Confederation of British Industry is the answer to all questions on consultation between the Government and industry, but it is not. Plenty of small companies are not members of the CBI and feel left out in one way or another. I am glad, too, about the Minister's remarks on open licensing. 
 Bearing in mind the fact that we have had a commitment from the Minister, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Robert Key: I beg to move amendment No. 49, in page 2, line 28, leave out sub-paragraph (b).
 Mr. Benton, I am sure that you and the Committee will be enormously relieved to hear that I am not a lawyer. My amendments are not tabled in that spirit; I am simply representing the voice of the common man and, I hope, common sense. 
 The amendment is not difficult: quite simply, I do not have a clue what subsection 5(b) means. The Home Secretary was disarmingly honest with me in the Chamber yesterday, but we shall come to that later. I will use my disarming simplicity now and say that I do not know what on earth subsection 5(b) means. It appears to say that 
```technology' means information . . . capable of use in connection with . . . an activity of any other kind whatsoever'', 
such as pencil sharpeners, garlic presses and cricket bats. It does not refer specifically to dual-use technology, but is as broad as the Atlantic ocean and as long as a piece of string. An incidental bit of useless information is that, when I was a Minister at the Department of National Heritage, I discovered that the length of a piece of string is 600 ft, so it is finite. One needs to learn in this place. 
 I do not know what the clause means. As a non-lawyer, all I know is that subsection (5)(b) is a lawyer's paradise. The courts will be full of people arguing about what it means by 
``an activity of any other kind whatsoever'', 
so I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what it means.

Nigel Griffiths: It may help the Committee if I give a little explanation of clause 2(5) and the definition of technology, which reads:
``information . . . capable of use in connection with . . . the development, production or use of any goods or software'' 
 ``the development of, or the carrying out of, an industrial or commercial'' 
or other activity. I assure the Committee that it could not cover garlic presses, because the subsection is governed by the purposes of the Bill. If hon. Members want to think up a few slightly more plausible examples, I would be happy to give a considered opinion on them. 
 I agree that many types of technology that could be covered by the definition will not in practice be subject to control. Given the pace of technological change in development, the concern is that new technologies could be developed in the future—perhaps the near future—that could threaten any consequence in the schedule. The broad definition of technology used in the subsection is therefore necessary to enable the Government to impose controls on any such technology, should it emerge. 
 The deletion of subsection (5)(b) would limit the type of technology controlled under the Bill. Any other type of information, no matter how serious its potential for misuse in the wrong hands, would be excluded from control if the amendment were made. Although I understand the concern that the new controls on technology transfer should be clear to industry and not an undue burden, I fear that the amendment would significantly restrict the powers available to the Government. 
 Subsection (5)(b) is necessary because we cannot foresee new types of technology that may be developed that, although not related to goods or software, could none the less be used to threaten any consequence in the schedule. Such is the pace of technological change and innovation that we must ensure that the new legislation is not rendered quickly out of date by the emergence of new technological methods and processes that fall outwith the relatively conventional definition of technology in subsection (5)(a). The UK cannot be in a position in which new primary legislation needs to be passed before new and possibly highly sensitive technology can be controlled, simply because the technology may not be covered or fully covered by the traditional definitions used in the existing control regime. 
 It is important for the Committee to appreciate the fact that sensitive technology might not necessarily be associated with goods or software. For instance, it might support more experimental work carried out before the actual development of the goods or software, or could simply relate to information connected with a specific activity that did not necessarily involve goods or software. 
 I assure the hon. Member for Salisbury and other members of the Committee that controls may be imposed on classes of technology only when their export or transfer from the UK could threaten one or more of the consequences in the schedule. That is clearly specified in the draft dummy order that has been made available to the Committee relating to the export of goods, technology transfers and technical assistance. In view of that, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

Robert Key: Well, that is exactly as I feared. The provision is a completely open-ended gift to the Government. The Minister has done a fine job in explaining what he means, and what he means is that I was absolutely right. Now he invites me to withdraw the amendment. Given that there will be a consultation period with industry, during which interested parties will have the opportunity to explore the matter more fully, and given that the Bill will go to the other place, where they are rather good at this sort of thing, I am prepared to give the Minister the benefit of the doubt.
 However, the Committee should recognise that this is a huge open-ended provision. I cannot recall any other legislation that not only allows the Minister and the Government to do what they wish but also makes it easy for them by including provision for unforeseen events and uninvented technologies. I remain concerned about that, but I can see that we will not get any further on the matter. However, I have a feeling that it will re-emerge in the other place as an important issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nigel Griffiths: The clause is a vital part of the Bill. It represents an essential modernisation of existing controls. At present, we can only impose controls on military technology in physical form, such as on paper or on computer disk. That does not make sense given the huge developments in communications, particularly in electronic communications, that have taken place since the 1939 Act came into force. We intend to use the powers in the clause to impose controls on the transfer abroad of military technology by electronic means, mirroring the controls that we now have on exports of such technology by physical means. We also intend to use these powers to introduce controls on the transfer by any means of technology for use in the development of weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of the delivery of such weapons. We are committed to taking action in this area by the terms of the European Union joint action programme on weapons of mass destruction, which we agreed last year and which will ensure that controls are implemented across Europe. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Robert Key: We agree with British industry and many other outside organisations such as charities and NGOs that the law in this area needs to be revised. We all broadly welcome the revision. We have drawn attention to some of our concerns, but we believe that this is a sensible review and we support it.

Gerald Howarth: I rise briefly to echo my hon. Friend's caveats about the open-ended definition of the powers that the clause gives to the Government. The clause could provide the Government with a substantial power on which there would be a limited check. I accept the Minister's point that technology moves on. There is no point in passing legislation that will be out of date in two years' time because technology has changed. However, it is the duty of Parliament to scrutinise the Government's intentions, and I have reservations about the catch-all nature of the clause.
 The Minister talked of weapons of mass destruction, and we all understand the need to be absolutely rigorous in ensuring that anything that goes to make a weapon of mass destruction is not exported from this country into the hands of those who would do us injury. However, we should also understand that the Bill's scope extends far beyond weapons of mass destruction to cover other technologies such as military pyrotechnics. I was involved with a company that made military pyrotechnics—simulated battlefield devices for training purposes. 
 We should not misrepresent the Bill. It is not simply about preventing weapons of mass destruction, or components thereof, from falling into the hands of people such as Saddam Hussein. It is much more comprehensive and wide-ranging, and imposes conditions on the export of a large number of components in the defence sector. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury is correct when he says that there reposes in the House of Lords a wealth of experience in these matters. It also contains some very fine minds. In the intervening period, they may be able to find a way to ensure that the Government achieve the overall objective without taking controls and powers that are so extensive that they are unaccountable in this important area. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 - Controls on provision of technical assistance overseas

Robert Key: I beg to move amendment No. 51, in page 3, line 29, after `assistance', insert `or foreign military assistance'.

Joe Benton: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 52, in page 3, line 36, after `assistance', insert `or foreign military assistance'.
 No. 53, in page 3, line 39, after `assistance', insert `or foreign military assistance'. 
 No. 54, in clause 10, page 6, line 6, at end insert— 
``armed conflict'' means any armed conflict between— 
 (a) the armed forces of foreign states, 
 (b) the armed forces of a foreign state and dissident armed forces or other armed groups; or 
 (c) armed groups.'.
 No. 55, in clause 10, page 6, line 12, at end insert— 
``foreign military assistance'' means military services or military-related services, or any attempt, encouragement, incitement or solicitation to render such services, except under the authority of the Secretary of State, in the form of— 
 (a) military assistance to a party to an armed conflict by means of— 
 (i) advice or training; 
 (ii) personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support; 
 (iii) personnel recruitment; 
 (iv) medical or para-medical services; or 
 (v) procurement of equipment; 
 (b) security services for the protection of individuals involved in armed conflict or their property; 
 (c) any action aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state; 
 (d) any other action that has the result of furthering the military interests of a party to the armed conflict but not humanitarian or civilian activities aimed at relieving the plight of civilians in an area of armed conflict.'.

Robert Key: In June 2000, European Union member states agreed a council joint action on the control of technical assistance related to weapons of mass destruction. There were important principles embodied in that council joint action. In paragraph 45 of command paper 5091, technical assistance was defined thus:
 ``Technical assistance, as defined in the joint action, means any technical support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, maintenance, or any other technical service and may take forms such as instruction, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting services and includes oral forms of assistance.'' 
It therefore encompasses both the transfer of technology by any means, including orally, and the provision of technical services. 
 I perceive that although we are signed up to that document, there is a gap in the Bill concerning mercenary activity. The Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 prevents British subjects from serving against countries with which the UK is at peace. However, there has been no successful prosecution under that Act since its introduction over 130 years ago. The Government's lack of power to regulate mercenaries was demonstrated in December 1989 when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries. According to the former Foreign Office Minister, the hon. Member for Manchester, Central (Mr. Lloyd), the Government have no plans to sign the convention. He said in a written answer on 15 June 1998: 
 ``We have no plans at present to sign and ratify the International Convention against Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. We have doubts concerning its legal enforceability in the United Kingdom. We are looking at options for national domestic regulation of military companies.'' —[Official Report, 15 June 1998; Vol. 314, c. 16.] 
That was back in 1998. Then the Legge report criticised the Government's handling of the situation in Sierra Leone and the activities of Sandline International. The Foreign Office then promised: 
 ``To issue within 18 months a Green Paper on mercenary activity, taking account of discussions with our partners in the UN, the EU and other international fora. The Paper will address both the international and the UK context.'' 
That was in the second report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, session 1998-99, on Sierra Leone, Cmnd. 4325. That Green Paper has yet to emerge. 
 On 6 April 2001, in a written answer at column 298W, the then Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Leeds, West (Mr. Battle), expressed his regret that the Green Paper expected in November 2000 had not been published. That was what I referred to yesterday afternoon in the Chamber when I intervened after the Home Secretary's statement. He generously answered by saying that he was unaware of the Green Paper. Why should he have been? He had his mind on other things. It was not, of course, a Home Office matter, and the Foreign Office was to deal with it. But then, we live in an age of joined-up government, so I would have expected the Home Secretary to be aware of the matter. I know that the Home Office is very much burdened at the moment, but it would have been nice to think that it was aware of it. Typically generously, the Home Secretary said that he would find out what was going on, and I am sure that he will, but I also had a word with his officials yesterday and asked them to make sure that the Department of Trade and Industry knew about this exchange, because while it was not my intention to embarrass the Minister dealing with the Bill in Committee the following day, I wanted an answer. 
 The regulation of mercenaries, private military companies and associated activities is long overdue. British mercenaries have been operating with impunity all over the world, especially in Africa, while successive Governments have stood back and wondered what to do, if anything. The presence of Britons in the al-Qaeda training camps and their involvement in terrorist attacks abroad has long been a source of complaint from foreign Governments, including the Governments of Algeria, India and Russia. However, British-based mercenary activity has been placed out in the open in the weeks since 11 September. There have been disturbing reports about the activities of groups in this country recruiting disaffected youths to fight for the Taliban. We cannot tolerate a situation in which British soldiers may be in action against fellow Britons. 
 The groups in question are not new, but their activities and the role that they may have played in the al-Qaeda terrorist network has been brought into focus following the events of 11 September. Two years ago the BBC and other European media organisations reported on Sakina Security Services, a company that specialised in high-risk jobs in the former Soviet Union and the civil war areas of the world. Until it was shut down, that company's website advertised a two-week course in the United States called the ``Ultimate Jihad Challenge''. It stated: 
 ``The course emphasis is on practical live-fire training. You will fire between 2,000 and 3,000 rounds of mixed calibre ammunition.'' 
Sakina also offered training in ambushing, sniper attacks, killing with knives and shooting at, through and from a vehicle. Sakina Security was run by Muhammad Jameel, who has been linked to Sheikh Omar bakri Mohammed and Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri. Abu Hamza's son and son-in-law were among the 10 British Muslims arrested in Yemen in December 1998. They subsequently confessed that they had planned to bomb the Movenpic hotel, where US military personnel are frequently billeted, the Anglican Christ Church clinic and the British consulate. Those young men were sent as couriers to Abu al-Hassan, leader of a splinter group of Islamic Jihad, known as the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, or the AAIA. 
 According to intelligence sources, both Abu Hassan and Abu Hamza have documented ties to bin Laden. According to those sources, following the bombing of American embassies in Africa, investigations were carried out in the United Kingdom into the activities of a fast food chain, mobile phone retailers and used car salesrooms, which Abu Hamza admitted formed part of funding for jihad activities. 
 The FBI has asked the Metropolitan police to trace an estimated 500 Britons who they suspect received training at al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Some of those recruits are known to have been sent to fight in what are seen as holy wars in Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan and the Balkans. Others may have returned home to Britain as sleepers. 
 We must take those organisations seriously. Although Professor Paul Wilkinson, who is director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, is not convinced that Sakina was involved in terrorism, he is very concerned that other groups could be. He said that, given the general support for the bin Laden message, their rhetoric is pretty fearsome and hair-raising, and that it is an encouragement to people to side with the holy war in which he believes. Certainly, the skills taught by companies such as Sakina would be useful to anyone who wished to undertake terrorist activities or to fight as a mercenary. 
 The Government have a duty to protect the young and impressionable from being press-ganged into fighting for the Taliban. For instance, Anwar Khan, who was captured by the Northern Alliance and is believed to be in Lachiday prison near the north-east border of Pakistan, was sent by his family to a religious school in Pakistan to help him overcome his drug addiction, but was then persuaded to go to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. 
 I have explained why we should no longer ignore the mercenary activities that originate in this country. Other nations in the European Union and countries further afield are complaining that Britain is lax in that regard. The Government should take this genuine opportunity to improve matters, in the interests of peace and security—not only for our own citizenry but for the citizens of other countries.

Jenny Tonge: The Liberal Democrats welcome the amendments, and are happy to support them. We, like Conservative Members, have been worried for some time about mercenary activities. I was amazed, during the election campaign, to come across two young people in my constituency who said that they were involved with mercenary activities and who claimed to have been trained in Afghanistan. I can hardly believe that such a thing could happen in the United Kingdom.
 I remind the Committee that we were promised a Green Paper on mercenary activities by November 2000; but, as the hon. Member for Salisbury pointed out, it has not yet appeared. I hope that the Government will accept the amendment as a promissory note for that Green Paper. Clearly, it would not encompass all the things that we need to say about the subject, but it would at least show the nation that the Government take mercenary activities seriously and that they will deliver the goods in the near future. 
 I am a little disappointed that amendment No. 55 does not mention police and security or paramilitary activity, but we may be able to correct that omission at a later stage. I was also interested to see that it includes the words, 
``the authority of the Secretary of State''. 
As I recall, the Sandline affair involved word of mouth--people understood that authority had been given. The amendment should say, 
``the written authority of the Secretary of State''. 
Nevertheless, we welcome the amendment. We hope that the Government will take it seriously, and that they will include it or a similar provision in the Bill.

Nigel Griffiths: We are all concerned about the role of mercenaries. The amendments seek to ensure that a range of activities under the heading ``foreign military assistance'' can be controlled under the Bill. I do not believe that such a change is necessary. Clause 4 is already a wide-ranging provision. It allows the Government to impose controls on ``technical'' services. That term is broad and it covers services provided by any individual or party in connection with the development of production, or the use of, any controlled goods or technology. In practice, that means services provided by anyone in connection with any military goods or technology. ``Anyone'' includes mercenaries; in answer to the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Dr. Tonge), it also includes police, security and paramilitary personnel. They are all covered under clause 4 and by the word ``services''.
 That wide-ranging new power implements the EU joint action on controls on the provision of technical assistance for weapons of mass destruction and related missile programmes; it allows us to implement any requirements for controls on technical assistance imposed by international embargoes; and it provides appropriate penalties.

Gerald Howarth: The Minister recognises the force of the argument made by my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Richmond Park. However, the Committee needs to hear that the Minister has taken specific legal advice on the amendments. I think that judges will be unwilling to extend the interpretation of technical assistance as the Minister suggests. Under the present circumstances, we must make it explicit to the courts of England that they have a duty to help to eradicate terrorism. In view of my hon. Friend's remarks, will the Minister tell us whether he has taken specific legal advice on the amendments?

Nigel Griffiths: I hardly think that my civil servants would advise me on the matter without taking full and proper legal advice.
 Aspects of the activities listed in the amendments, such as training in the use of weapons, which is a key mercenary activity, come within the scope of the clause. Powers over the transfer of technology and the trade in controlled goods allow for the control of other aspects of such activities, such as the procurement of equipment, which is another aspect of mercenary work. The wide-ranging powers in the clause will therefore deal with many of the concerns that have been voiced.

Jenny Tonge: I must dispute the Minister's claim that subsection (4) covers actual people. We are talking about people who are training to be mercenaries and to fight, perhaps with their bare hands. We are not talking about goods and services or technology of any description.

Nigel Griffiths: I should not have to tell the hon. Lady that mercenaries need equipment and technology; they thrive on it. They do not generally go around using their bare hands; they are well armed. It is clear from the examples that we have been given of websites and from advertisements that people will not train in America without the equipment that the hon. Member for Salisbury mentioned. It is important to note that people provide services, and mercenaries provide a despicable service that requires an infrastructure. We got a flavour of the infrastructure of terrorism from the hon. Gentleman's contribution.

Jenny Tonge: I must press the Minister on this issue. I said in my opening remarks that the actions of 11 September were carried out by trained men—we can call them mercenaries or whatever we like—who used their bare hands and perhaps Stanley knives. That is the point that Conservative Members are trying to make in the amendments.

Nigel Griffiths: I think that the hon. Lady said that Stanley knives were used, and the record will show that, but I do not want to get into the particulars of that tragic case when I know that the Americans and others are investigating it. However, as the hon. Member for Salisbury and the hon. Lady rightly said, private military companies and mercenaries are the subject of a forthcoming Green Paper, which will set out the options for their regulation. In the Bill, we are trying to provide the Government with powers to ensure that we can put in place an export control regime that meets the challenge posed by the modern world. That is why we are acting in concert with the European Union, the United Nations and the various international export control regimes, such as the missile technology control regime.
 The controls will be introduced on technical assistance and will derive from international obligations. That is the only way to make them fully effective. If members of the Committee believe that a framework of controls such as has existed hitherto was in any way competent to meet the crisis that we witnessed during the past few weeks, they are mistaken. The reason for the changes is to try to tighten controls on armaments technology and on methods of transferring technology, and to starve mercenary groups of illegal traders and brokers involved in breaching embargoes of the necessary resources. That is what the framework is all about.

Robert Key: When will the Green Paper be published?

Nigel Griffiths: As the hon. Gentleman will know, that is a matter on which the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office will take the lead. He raised the matter with the Home Secretary yesterday, and I am sure that the Foreign Secretary will have read his comments as well and will be happy to respond as soon as a date is known.

Robert Key: I am grateful for the support of the hon. Member for Richmond Park, who has a long track record on the subject. I was especially interested in what she said on police, security and paramilitary activity, about which we have a blind spot in this country because we do not have a paramilitary police force, unlike almost every other European nation. If one visits Kosovo—as I have several times—one will see amazing work carried out not only by the regular and reserve forces, but by the Ministry of Defence police. Our soldiers are not policemen, but we do not have paramilitaries. The MOD police—a regular armed service—perform the function that paramilitaries would perform elsewhere.
 I considered that the subject was a little wide of the mark, and that I would have pushed my luck if I had introduced it for debate. However, I pricked up my ears in the Chamber yesterday when the Home Secretary said that he would seek to reintroduce the clauses on the MOD police in the Armed Forces Bill, the passage of which was not completed due to the general election. He also said that he would go further and introduce legislation to extend the jurisdiction of, for example, the British Transport police. That is long overdue, as long as it is done in the right way. 
 Of course, there are drafting issues in relation to my amendment. As I have said, I am not a lawyer, but I have done my best. The Minister will not be surprised to hear that I was disappointed when he said that some provisions in the amendments were not necessary. It is astonishing for a Minister to say that it is not necessary for such legislation to cover mercenaries. 
 The Minister also said that mercenaries were despicable, but I do not think that they need be so. This country has a long record, lasting hundreds of years, of use of mercenaries. The private forces of the East India Company were not despicable. Some consider the Gurkhas to have started as mercenaries, and they are certainly not despicable. It is unregulated mercenaries who are despicable, and they can cause havoc. I have been motivated to urge for regulation, although I do not normally like regulation as a political philosophy. It would be of great assistance on the issue to this country and elsewhere. 
 The Minister was unable to answer the question about when there would be a Green Paper, but I do not blame him for that. He has had a very sticky wicket this morning, which he has played with competence; I am grateful to him for that. I am sure that the Government will reconsider the situation and I will do my best to ensure that they do. However, the Minister seems to think that his legislation conforms with and answers the Council joint action on the control of technical assistance, which I quoted at the beginning, and which, as the hon. Member for Richmond Park said, specifically includes instruction, training, the transmission of working knowledge of skills and consulting services, and includes all forms of assistance. The legislation does not conform with that. It omits the whole area and that is why I must, with considerable regret, seek to divide the Committee on this issue. 
 We shall return to this issue again and again and I have a sneaking feeling, reading Labour Members' body language and listening to Opposition Members' contributions, that the Committee is uncomfortable with the Government's position on the matter. It is all happening very quickly, but on this occasion I cannot give the Government the benefit of the doubt—that would be quite wrong. I want to make it clear that many people outside the House as well as inside it will be observing carefully the Government's decision not to allow the amendment.

Rob Marris: If the amendments, including amendment No. 55, were to be included in the Bill, how would that be more efficacious than the failed 19th century Act to which the hon. Gentleman referred?

Robert Key: It should be very clear that the details that are laid before the hon. Gentleman bear absolutely no relation to that earlier Act. However, the hon. Gentleman is doing his best to support the Government's insupportable position. I commend him for his loyalty—no doubt he will have a job quite soon. However, that does not alter the fact that the Government are omitting to take advantage of an opportunity, which will be widely noted both inside and outside the House. I therefore seek to divide the Committee on the matter.

Nigel Griffiths: I am happy to make a final attempt to persuade the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment by answering some of his points directly. I can assure him that all aspects of the EU joint action can and will be implemented under the Bill through the powers under clause 4 on technical assistance and those under clause 2 on technology transfers. I have just heard that an announcement on the publication of the Green Paper is expected in the House soon.
 I did not say that the control of mercenaries was unnecessary. My point was that the Government have been holding consultations on the issue, but that it is not a matter for this Bill. This is not the Bill for regulating mercenary activity; it is a framework for ensuring that we have proper control of the export of arms and the technologies associated with them for the 21st century, which is why the wording is as broad as possible. I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment and wait and see what the Green Paper on mercenaries proposes. He should look to that for proper legislation on mercenary activity.

Robert Key: The ``not me guv'' answer will not do. I regret very much that we have seen so little commitment. As for inviting us to wait a little longer for the Green Paper, that takes the biscuit, and I am afraid that it does not change my mind in seeking to divide the Committee.

Bill Tynan: If the amendment were successful, would that mean that we would not require a Green Paper on the issue of mercenaries?

Robert Key: If there had been any suggestion from the Minister that he was prepared to take the amendment away, consult widely on it or do whatever he liked with it, but with a commitment to come back with a firm proposal to include mercenaries in the Bill, I would have withdrawn the amendment. However, he did not and he has missed his chance.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 - Controls on trade in controlled goods

Nigel Griffiths: I beg to move amendment No. 56, in page 4, line 7, after `disposal;' insert—
 `( ) their movement;'.

Joe Benton: With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 57, 59, 60 and 61.

Nigel Griffiths: Amendments Nos. 56, 57, 59, 60 and 61 seek to ensure that the Government have the power to introduce controls on the movement of controlled goods where there is no acquisition or disposal and there are no activities facilitating or otherwise connected with acquisition or disposal.
 We need the amendments to ensure that we can implement our commitment to introduce controls on trade to embargoed destinations that are analogous to those introduced under UN sanctions and embargo orders. UN trade embargoes seek to control not only those who sell or supply goods to an embargoed destination, but those who deliver goods in their ownership to the embargoed territory. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that the Government should have powers under the Bill to introduce trade controls for any embargoed destination that are as comprehensive as those introduced under the United Nations Act 1946 to implement binding UN embargoes. Adding movement to the list of activities that can be regulated under the clause will allow us to do that. 
 The amendments also give the Government the option of implementing trade controls imposed by EU embargoes by orders under the Bill, rather than the European Communities Act 1972. Evasion of such controls will then attract the 10-year maximum penalty allowed under the Bill, rather than the two-year maximum penalty possible under the Act. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that it is desirable for the Government to be able to implement fully under the Bill trade controls that are analogous to those introduced under UN sanctions, and I invite hon. Members to support the amendments.

Robert Key: We support the amendments.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 57, in page 4, line 9, leave out `or disposal' and insert `, disposal or movement'.—[Nigel Griffiths.]

Nigel Griffiths: I beg to move amendment No. 58, in page 4, line 10, leave out subsection (3).
 The removal of subsection (3) is necessary to remove a potential loophole, whereby brokers or traffickers who deliberately arranged for goods to be shipped via the UK might have been able to claim that they were immune from the controls. The subsection was originally included to ensure that brokers did not require both an export licence and a trading licence for the same transactions. However, that can be achieved in secondary legislation and the Government have concluded that that approach would be better in this case. That is reflected in the dummy orders. I hope that the Committee will share the Government's wish to tighten up the Bill in this respect, and I invite hon. Members to support the amendment.

Robert Key: With the caveat that I mentioned earlier, that I am suspicious always of secondary legislation replacing primary legislation, and that the matter should be fully aired in consultation, I am fully prepared to support the amendment, which appears practical.
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 59, in page 4, line 21, leave out `or disposal' and insert `, disposal or movement'. 
 No. 60, in page 4, line 24, leave out from `gift' to end of line and insert `;and'.—[Nigel Griffiths.]

Malcolm Savidge: I beg to move amendment No. 2, in page 4, line 27, leave out from `(c)' to end of line 29 and insert
`financing, transportation, freight-forwarding, or taking any other action (or agreeing with another to do so) that facilitates the manufacture, export or import of a defence article or defence service, irrespective of its origin, are activities which facilitate the acquisition or disposal of goods'.

Joe Benton: With this we may take amendment No. 66, in page 4, line 27, leave out sub-paragraph 5(c) and insert—
`( ) activities which facilitate the acquisition or disposal of goods include transporting, freight forwarding, mediating, insuring, financing, advertising or promoting.'.

Malcolm Savidge: I welcome the comments that the Minister made at the outset of our deliberations, to say that we must take into account the tragic events in the United States and their relevance to the Bill. In that spirit we need to examine every issue as carefully as we can. We need to show the maximum flexibility.
 I welcome the news that the Government are minded to proceed in that way, and particularly my hon. Friend's statement that there would be a significant consultative period for the secondary legislation, and that the industry and non-governmental organisations would be included in extensive public consultation. I also welcome amendment No. 59, which relates to movement and thus shifts the debate towards one of the issues that I shall raise in moving my amendment—transportation. That issue is explicit in some of the draft orders and in the Bill, for example in relation to embargoed destinations, torture equipment and long-range missile technology. However, I am anxious that we should deal with it clearly in other respects. 
 With respect to embargoed destinations, certain important matters are covered. However, although Afghanistan—to take the example that we are thinking about at present—would be an embargoed destination, many of the neighbouring countries would not be. We would need to ensure that there was provision for situations in which equipment might be transported to neighbouring countries and supplied to Mr. bin Laden's organisation, or any sister organisations. Transport is not just a theoretical issue. There are allegations of British companies being involved in transporting weapons to, for example, rebel forces in Liberia, Sudan and India. Whether those allegations prove true or false, India is not an embargoed destination. 
 The amendment relates not just to transport but to freight forwarding, by which I mean the organisation and administration of transport, and to financing. I am encouraged by the Minister's amendments on movement, but I am concerned about the wording in the dummy order on trade in controlled goods, which states: 
 ``Paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not apply to any person whose sole involvement in relation to the acquisition or disposal of any controlled goods is to provide or agree to provide—
(a) transportation services,
(b) financing or financial services,
(c) insurance services, or
(d) general advertising or promotion services.''
 It strikes me that—especially in the context of the interview that the Prime Minister gave at the weekend, in which he said that we must control all aspects of the provision of weapons to such organisations—it is vital to ensure that we cover all such areas. It is also integral to what the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in the House yesterday concerning the finance-related legislation that the Government intend to introduce. Finance is a vital part of the whole process. The purpose of the amendment is to gain an assurance from the Minister that there will be a careful attempt to close every possible loophole in relation to all aspects of the export of dangerous weapons or materials to illicit groups or to countries to which we would not want to see such things exported.

Jenny Tonge: Amendment No. 66 is in a similar vein and seeks to include activities that facilitate the acquisition or disposal of goods including transporting—which the Government amendments have covered—and freight forwarding, and also mediating, insuring, financing, advertising or promoting. I shall not repeat the speech that has just been made—that would be tedious—but it is important to incorporate the amendments and to ensure that the Minister intends to include all those activities, as his colleagues in the House said yesterday. It was intended that all be covered. May we have an assurance that all will be covered?

Robert Key: I believe that the Minister will provide a satisfactory answer in this case. However, I share the concerns of the hon. Members for Richmond Park and for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge). I shall ask the Minister in a moment to clarify why, on page 37 of the Customs and Excise dummy draft statutory instrument, there is a long list of countries and destinations referred to in article 9 but then the Customs and Excise [Embargoed Destination] (Sanctions) Order—the one at the back of the dummy pack—says on page 6,
 ``Schedule, Controlled Goods specify the goods covered'' 
and there is a blank page. I wonder whether there is a reason for the blank page. Perhaps he considers that the list on page 37 is adequate. Although the Government have made a great effort to address the issue of control on movement, there seems to be a mismatch here and I shall be grateful to hear a logical explanation, if that is at all possible in the time available. I expect that if I wait for just a few more minutes, one will be forthcoming. It is extremely important. No one has suggested that it should not happen, so I do not seek to oppose the Government. Perhaps this is not the right moment and it should be done when we consider secondary legislation. However, as the Minister was kind enough to let us see the dummy orders and to start today's proceedings with some advice on them, I thought that this might be the opportunity to probe further.

Vera Baird: I do not want to add much more, save to associate myself with the concerns that have been expressed on this point—in particular, as a lawyer, with that of the hon. Gentleman, who confesses to not being one, about the mismatch between the amendments that the Minister has tabled and the specific exclusion of transportation services in the order.
 I would go further. A real cause for concern occurs within the dummy order on trade in controlled goods, page 3, paragraph 5(b), which has been referred to, concerning the financing or financial services that must back up the movement, which—it is now clear—will be included in the legislation while specifically excluded from the secondary legislation. Similarly, the advertising or promotion services that must back up the distribution and transportation are now specifically included in the primary legislation but excluded from the secondary legislation. I find it difficult to comprehend how the amendments could permit of that express exclusion, which seems to be part and parcel of similar areas of trade in such goods. 
 I add my anxieties to those already expressed and exemplified in those particular ways. I query paragraph 5(a) and I wonder whether paragraphs 5(b) and 5(d) are not part of what is now to be found in primary legislation.

Nigel Griffiths: I believe that we all share the concerns that have been voiced in respect of the amendments. However, I must tell the Committee that, by listing precise activities, the amendments may narrow our powers. It is important to maintain the broad scope of the powers contained in clause 5.
 I confirm at the outset that, under the clause, the Secretary of State would be able to impose controls on financing, transportation, freight forwarding, insuring, mediating and advertising or promotion activities in relation to trade between overseas countries. The dummy orders make it clear that we intend to use the powers in clause 5 in full to control the supply or delivery, or any acts calculated to promote the supply and delivery, of arms to embargoed destinations. We intend also to introduce controls on the supply or delivery and acts calculated to promote the supply or delivery of torture equipment and long-range missiles to any destination. 
 Those controls are intended to catch financing, transportation, freight forwarding, insuring, mediating, advertising or promotion activities. Indeed, we consider that those activities are already caught by orders made under the United Nations Act 1946, which implement binding UN arms embargoes, on which the new controls are modelled. 
 The powers provided in clause 5 are deliberately couched in general terms. Clause 5(2)(b) refers to 
``activities which facilitate or are otherwise connected'' 
with trade in controlled goods, including their acquisition or disposal. Those general terms are necessary to ensure that the powers granted are broad enough to cover the activities that we may need to be controlled in the orders. 
 It is important to maintain the broad scope of the power in clause 5. However, we consider that the wide-ranging controls that we plan to impose in relation to embargoed destinations, torture equipment and missiles are justified. Our aim is essentially to prohibit involvement in that sort of trade. A licence would be provided only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as for the supply of equipment to peacekeeping forces. 
 However, it would not be appropriate for the controls on trafficking and brokering of all military equipment to any destination to apply to those whose sole involvement is in finance, transportation, insurance or general advertising or promotional services. That would impose an unjustified and heavy burden on those sectors. Imposing controls on the advertising or general marketing of military equipment would be difficult to justify and impractical to police. It would not be practical to operate such a regime. However, the regime does apply to those who mediate or broker such deals. In learning from other countries, which claim to have tough arms-control regulations but which have failed for one reason or another to enforce them, we are driven to make the legislation as practical as possible. We believe that it does so without the amendment.

Vera Baird: The Minister spoke about the danger of narrowing the ambit of clause 5(2)(b) by specifying the activities in the amendments. That could easily be dealt with. Clause 5(2)(b) reads:
``activities which facilitate or are otherwise connected with their acquisition or disposal''. 
If that is intended to cover the activities mentioned in amendments Nos. 2 and 66, there seems no harm whatever to be derived from stating that the provision will include, although not exclusively, those activities and so listing them. If the Minister intends that those activities should be covered, listing them would greatly reassure hon. Members. Will he further consider that possibility?

Nigel Griffiths: No, I do not believe that I can reassure my hon. Friend of that. The intention is clear. We must not allow ourselves, or any Government or their agents, to be bogged down in chasing individual financing or individual insurance. That would divert vital arms-monitoring resources from the illegal and immoral arms dealers, those who are in breach of United Nations embargoes or other embargoes or will be in breach of the terms of the Bill. Such brokers and traffickers are the people on whom we want to focus our attention.
 As I have said, if the experience of other countries is anything to go by, the more a country has talked tough, the less enforcement there has been. Such countries are trying—not very successfully, as we know from the trade in illegal arms—to crack down on problems that are not at the core of what we are trying to tackle in the Bill. The Bill is crafted to give us among the toughest, and certainly the most practical and enforceable legislation. That is why it is so framed.

Malcolm Savidge: I said that the amendment was a probing amendment so I did not intend to press it. Obviously, one would want the clause to be as broad as possible, and I totally accept that I would want it to be enforceable rather than simply to appear tough.
 I stress, however, that I mentioned that I recognised the fact that provision of the type for which I asked was specifically included in relation to missiles, torture equipment and embargo destinations. I am still puzzled as to why we should therefore definitely rule it out in relation to other material that could be dangerous. In light of the events of 11 September, it is crucial that we show the maximum flexibility possible. 
 My gravest concern is not on the clause, but on the dummy orders and whether the exclusion should be so explicit. I feel strongly that the conscious and knowing financing or transportation of materials is a serious issue. That seems precisely in line with comments made by my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others. I hope that it can be thought about carefully, especially in consideration of the final terms of the dummy orders and in the consultation that the Government will have with organisations. I recognise that the concerns of industry and the finance world would have to be reasonably protected, but we have properly recognised in the past few weeks that control of financing and transportation can be a vital part of the fight against terror and the appalling dangers that may face us in coming decades. 
 With those appeals to the Minister, I will be content to withdraw my amendment.

Nigel Griffiths: I thank my hon. Friend for raising that issue. We are, of course, working with the Home Office on the emergency legislation and we will ensure close co-operation to get the proper legislation to prevent and deter terrorism.
 My hon. Friend makes an important point when he says that the orders are dummy orders and the matter has been put out to consultation. His arguments and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) and other members of the Committee have been noted, and I expect that we shall receive submissions on the matter. I have set out clearly my desire to produce workable and practical but tough legislation. I look forward to reading the considered views of others on the dummy orders.

Jenny Tonge: I should like to echo the remarks of the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North. The remarks that were prepared for the Minister so that he could respond to our questions this morning seem to have been drafted before 11 September. I get the feeling that those who wrote them have not thought, ``Hey, this is a whole new ball game; we've got to think about this in broader terms.'' As the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North said, the purpose of amendments Nos. 2 and 66 was to encompass remarks that had been made by the Secretaries of State of other Departments, and by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Prime Minister. I am slightly reassured to hear that the Minister understands that, and that the issue will be incorporated in the consultation, which is becoming very technical. However, I want to impress it on him that the Committee represents a perfect opportunity to tighten things up and introduce legislation that is relevant to the current situation, for which we would otherwise have to wait months. It seems a pity to lose this opportunity. I will not press amendment No. 66, but I hope that the clause will be strengthened later in the Bill's passage.

Malcolm Savidge: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment made: No. 61, in page 4, leave out lines 26 to 29 and insert— 
 `( ) For the purposes of this section (without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2)(b))— 
 (a) the making of an agreement with another to acquire, dispose of or move goods, and 
 (b) the making of arrangements under which another person— 
 (i) acquires, disposes of or moves goods; or 
 (ii) agrees with a third person to acquire, dispose of or move goods, are activities which facilitate the acquisition, disposal or movement of the goods.'—[Nigel Griffiths.]

Jenny Tonge: I beg to move amendment No. 67, in page 4, line 30, leave out from `controls' to end of line 32 and insert—
`shall be imposed on all acts committed by persons in the United Kingdom and on all acts committed by United Kingdom persons wherever located.'.
 The subject of arms brokering and the activities of arms traffickers is very dear to Liberal Democrat hearts. It seems to us that, using modern technology such as laptop computers and mobile phones, it is now the easiest thing in the world, if a person's activities as an arms broker are banned in, say, Surrey, for them to nip across to their house in the Caribbean or in mainland Europe and carry on their activities there. 
 It seems extraordinary that the Government should not want to include the activities of arms brokers—wherever they are—in the scope of the Bill. Indeed, the Government's manifesto commitment was to control the activities of arms brokers and traffickers wherever they were located. There was no intention, in the Labour party's manifesto, to limit the legislation to these shores. 
 If the legislation does not cover such activities, those who conduct them will simply step out of the country to conduct the brokering deals and they will be perfectly safe. German controls suffer from this weakness, applying only to people who conduct their activities on German territory. Brinley Salzmann, exports director of the Defence Manufacturers Association, in his evidence to the Quadripartite Committee, said that the German system 
``catches the good guys and the bad guys have moved to Cyprus.'' 
By contrast, United States legislation controls brokering activities by US persons who operate overseas, and US officials believe—I hope that they still believe—that that has significant deterrent effect. Precedent exists for the exercise of such extra-territorial powers in the UK. For example, the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 applies to people abroad, as do the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and the Landmines Act 1998, so why should legislation on arms brokering not do so? 
 There is international consensus on the fact that arms brokering is a reprehensible activity in most cases, and that concerted action is needed involving the take-up of extra-territorial jurisdiction. The negotiations in the lead-up to the July 2001 United Nations conference on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons demonstrate growing international consensus to suggest that brokering is in urgent need of international regulation, with the UK taking a lead in pushing for a legally binding convention on arms brokering—so why has the loophole been allowed to stay in the Bill? 
 I hope that the Minister will take the subject seriously. It calls into question the passion and seriousness with which the Government take the control of arms. I do not know why they have left out arms brokers who operate abroad. I feel passionately that the subject should be part of the Bill, and I hope that he gives us an adequate answer.

Gerald Howarth: I explicitly understand what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve. She made her case clear; she wants to ensure that UK citizens, subjects of Her Majesty the Queen, wherever they may operate, will not be able to escape the effect of the proposed law. However, I am not clear about what the clause will do to meet the hon. Lady's objectives and to deal with Her Majesty's subjects.
 The clause states: 
 ``Trade controls may be imposed on acts done outside the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, but only if they are done by a person who is, or is acting under the control of, a United Kingdom person.'' 
``United Kingdom person'' is a defined term. Acts done by a UK citizen will clearly be caught, I should have thought, and I am sure that that is what the Minister will argue. However, I wonder what will happen to a person who acts under the control of a UK person. 
 In many military defence contracts, much of the negotiation is carried out using consultants and agents in foreign countries. I can think back many years to a country such as Nigeria, for example, where Britain had some important defence contracts in the 1970s and 1980s. As I recall, agents were often employed. I would like to know from the Minister whether the measure would apply to agents acting on behalf of the UK, even though they were not UK citizens. That raises rather important constitutional points. I am not sure how, constitutionally, we can exercise control over foreign nationals who carry out legitimate activities on their own territory outside the United Kingdom. It is important for the Minister to clarify whether the Government intend the Bill to extend to foreign nationals operating in their own country. If not, what is meant by 
``a person who is, or is acting under the control of, a United Kingdom person'' 
where that person is not a citizen of the United Kingdom—not, indeed, a subject of Her Majesty?

Nigel Griffiths: The amendment would require trade controls introduced by the Secretary of State to apply to all acts carried out in the United Kingdom and all acts done outside it by UK persons. No exceptions would be made for particular types of activities. The Government's proposed controls under clause 5 would apply to acts carried out in the UK and to the activities of UK persons overseas. The wording that the hon. Member for Aldershot raised is intended to ensure that a United Kingdom national cannot get round the controls by instructing a foreign national overseas to act on his or her behalf. However, the controls that are being set up apply to trafficking and brokering to embargoed destinations. It is intended that they should apply to activities capable of being controlled under the clause.
 The real issue is what would happen if a UK national nipped across to the Caribbean and took part, to use the example given by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, in illegal trafficking or brokering. The answer is that the minute such a person returned to Britain they would be arrested. It could not be plainer than that. I shall give another example. If that person, perhaps a UK national by birth, was living in North Korea and was trafficking or brokering in arms between North Korea and another regime in that part of the world, under the hon. Lady's amendment there would be an obligation for us to request extradition, to send someone to interview the person concerned, and thus to tie up people in a way that would be impractical. 
 I notice that the hon. Lady praised the United States system, and I draw her attention to the comments of the Campaign Against Arms Trade against that system. It states in one of its most recent briefings: 
 ``The US has one of the strongest export control regimes in the world, with legislation making the `diversion of technologies to unauthorized uses and prohibited third parties' illegal.'' 
However, it states that 
```inadequate enforcement' means that there are frequent abuses''. 
We plan through the Bill to crack down on the abuses and abusers within our jurisdiction, to our maximum ability.

Jenny Tonge: I am a little mystified about an earlier remark by the Minister that extradition would be required to get at a British national who was living abroad and acting as an arms broker. I thought that we believed in extradition and wanted people who were guilty of crimes to be extradited to this country, if necessary. Surely there is a basis for that in international law.

Nigel Griffiths: I am not sure whether I chose the right example, as I do not know whether we have an extradition treaty with North Korea. [Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, South (Mr. Pearson) has informed me that we do not. There are many other such countries. That brings me back to remarks that I have often made in the Committee and in the Chamber, to the effect that the best way to control arms is to ensure that the maximum number of countries adhere to UN, EU and other international embargoes. That is why we devote efforts to ensuring that all countries subscribe to the sort of tough arms regime that will allow the enforcement of UN and other embargoes and will de-escalate world conflicts that have brought such misery. The tracking down of UK nationals who may be involved in illegal activities and who are either based in Britain or trading abroad and returning to Britain is one of the core aims of the Bill.
 However, as I know from the briefings that I have received from NGOs, we are dealing with resourceful, cunning and deceitful people trafficking illegally in such arms and the technologies associated with them, in breach of UN embargoes and in a way that leaves behind little trace. Under the legislation, if such people swan back here from the Caribbean or, as in the example that I have provided, from North Korea—if they set foot in Britain—they can be arrested. It is important to ensure that such practical measures, which have not hitherto been available, are put in place and that such people are tracked down and dealt with. That is the important reason why we have framed the Bill as we have. 
 I will repeat the criticisms that have been made by others—I have no knowledge of them—of the United States. In the words of the Campaign Against Arms Trade, it is pointless having a regime such as that of the US, which includes everything that people are calling for such as extradition of nationals wherever they are and prior parliamentary scrutiny of measures, if the enforcement regime is weak. The Bill contains the necessary steps to give us among the toughest and most practical regimes in the world, so that the sorts of criticisms that are made of regimes in other countries do not apply to us. 
 The amendment is not practical and would not help to further the aims of the Bill. Rather, it would divert resources that I and, I believe, the Committee and the public would much prefer to be focused on and channelled into intelligence on the arms brokers and traders who may be operating offshore and using other devices to avoid being caught by existing legislation. They will be caught in an effective manner.

Gerald Howarth: May I ask the Minister to deal with a point that I raised? I am not sure whether he has addressed it. What is the status of someone who is not a British subject, but who is nevertheless instrumental in facilitating this trade of which we disapprove? Is the Bill intended to encompass such people?

Nigel Griffiths: Yes, my understanding is that the intention is to encompass them. If they came to the United Kingdom for any purpose, they would be caught.
 Let me be clear on that—I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman's point and would like to retract what I just said. It is the UK citizen who is instructing that foreign national who would be caught by the legislation, not the foreign national himself or herself.

Jenny Tonge: I am pretty disappointed by what the Minister has said. It sounds as though he is saying that it is all too difficult and would not really work. The implication is that we cannot introduce a law that might not be efficient, even though the United States of America—

Nigel Griffiths: Has an efficient one?

Jenny Tonge: We are living in times when we need all sorts of measures to tackle these problems, and it seems to me that we are not trying hard enough.

Phyllis Starkey: Clearly everyone agrees that we need to take the action necessary in response to the 11 September attack. However, is the hon. Lady not in danger of suggesting that we should make a meaningless gesture that we know will not be effective, just to demonstrate that we are doing something?

Jenny Tonge: No. I am thinking about the comic sketch—does anyone know it?—in which they say, ``Now is the time in war to make a futile gesture''. This is not a futile gesture; it is something that I feel very strongly about. If United Kingdom citizens are trafficking arms or drugs anywhere in the world, they should be covered by this law and we should do something about them. I am not prepared to withdraw the amendment.

Nigel Griffiths: I respect the hon. Lady's sentiments. However, is she telling us that the chief constable in her constituency should divert police resources to a wild goose chase—round the world to North Korea, for example—to arrest someone who, perhaps, left Britain with her or his parents when aged one or two, has never been back and never intends to come back? My constituents and, I suspect, most other constituents would not want that to be done when the outcome is likely to be resistance by the other country to extradition, and fruitless and expensive court battles. We would divert attention from those who might—as the hon. Lady suggested in her example—be nipping off to the Caribbean and coming back. First and foremost, those are the people we want to get hold of. Under present legislation, we have been unable to do so effectively.
 I am sorry that this intervention is slightly lengthy. Surely we should have in place the practical measures that many of us have longed for for many years, rather than a raft of completely impractical ones that cause us to end up with a regime that is criticised by key NGOs concerned with the issue as being hopeless and ineffective.

Jenny Tonge: I simply ask the Minister why this can be operated in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, the Chemical Weapons Act 1996, the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and in landmine legislation but not in the Export Control Bill. Answer comes there none.

Joe Benton: Order. The Minister was intervening before the hon. Lady came back with a further question. Is it the hon. Lady's wish to press the amendment?

Jenny Tonge: Yes.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 1, Noes 10.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Robert Key: We have aired several concerns about the clause and will not oppose it. However, I want to flag up worries that have been expressed to us by industry, especially by those most directly affected by the clause. They are concerned, again, at the vague words used, such as ``acts'' in line 30 of page 4. What is an act? They are worried that it might mean anything from placing an order to making a sales pitch, or simply agreeing to go to a trade exhibition. The word is extremely vague and I am not sure that the problem will be dealt with in secondary legislation either.
 I give the example to flag up the fact that although the industrial concerns affected by the Bill by and large accept the need for clause 5, they have some reservations that it is right for the Opposition to express.

Gerald Howarth: I wish to support the reservations that my hon. Friend expressed. I also want to reassert the point that the Committee must be under no illusions: however tightly the Government try to draw legislation to encompass those who traffic in illegal weapons and so on, there is a grave risk that the people caught and hampered will be engaged in legitimate activity, and that those who are the targets of such measures will still get away with impunity. As the hon. Member for Richmond Park suggested, they will be beyond the reach of UK law.
 The Minister accepted that such people would not be touchable until they came back to UK soil. He is right, and I do not think that there is another way around it. Look how long Ronnie Biggs was capable of sweating it out in Brazil after the great train robbery. We have a limited opportunity to deal with the criminals, and I am concerned that the controls on trade in controlled goods will impose considerable burdens on industry. 
 The dummy orders, which were delivered to us at the end of last week, are relevant as they set out the controlled goods. To be perfectly candid, having glanced through them, I have no clue what azidomethylmethyloxetane is and nor, I suspect, does 99.99 per cent. recurring of the population of the UK. We are simply incapable of interpreting the documents. Do Ministers feel that they have covered the ground comprehensively? I am sure that some wretched chemical has been omitted, probably because someone cannot spell it. The documents are extremely extensive. 
 Like my hon. Friend, I have spoken to the Defence Manufacturers Association, which has not had the chance to go through the dummy orders. It did not even know that they had been published. Throughout our proceedings on the Bill, we have criticised the Government about the fact that we have debated controls on the trade in controlled goods without having a definition of what controlled goods were. We now have those definitions, but only at the end of the summer recess, and no one has had a chance to go through them. 
 I am disappointed that the Government have failed to produce the dummy orders—that is probably a good description of them—until now, and that they do not appear to have made them available to industry in time for it to comment. The Committee has not had time to receive such comments, so we have not been able to feed them in and hold Ministers accountable for the orders on the concerns that are certain to be raised by industry. 
 I hope that you will agree, Mr. Benton, that it is entirely appropriate that my criticisms of the Government should be levelled now, and that Ministers should make themselves available to answer them. They cannot make themselves available to the Committee now because of the 12-week consultation process. In my view, that is constitutionally improper. 
 The dummy orders came out on Friday. They are an integral part of the legislation. The Committee has had an opportunity to assess the dummy orders, yet they are couched in language that most of us will fail to comprehend; and the industries to which the orders will apply, and against which substantial and draconian penalties will be imposed if they transgress the orders, have been unable to comment or to let us have their views. We are therefore about to give the Government a blank cheque on the control of trade in controlled goods provided under clause 5. 
Mr. Ian Pearson (Dudley, South) indicated dissent.

Gerald Howarth: It is no good for the Whip to shake his head. It is constitutionally outrageous that we should have come to this pass. The Government have had the whole summer in which to bring the dummy orders forward. The Opposition made it perfectly plain—I believe that if they had any concern or respect for Parliament, Labour Members would feel the same—that we were to debate the Bill in advance of having the meat of it. That is why we dealt with the clauses in the order set by you, Mr. Benton, because it enabled us to deal with those matters last.
 I register the strongest possible protest that we should have been dealt with in that way. I realise that the Government now have other things on their mind, but they could have brought the dummy orders out long before now, allowing industry to consider them during the summer so that we would now have its comments. As it is, we have been presented with 50 pages of detailed regulation that most of us are unable to understand and over which we cannot hold the Government to account. I must tell the Minister that that is not acceptable.

Nigel Griffiths: I warmly commend the clause to the Committee. It allows for the introduction of controls over trafficking and brokering. At present, we have no power to impose controls on trafficking or brokering except when they are needed to implement binding commitments to the UN. It is vital that the Government should have the power to control trafficking and brokering in goods the export of which is subject to control, particularly to help prevent the supply of arms to regions of instability or conflict.
 We intend to use the power first to impose controls on the supply and delivery by persons in the UK, or UK persons abroad, of arms to any embargoed destination. We intend to impose similar controls on the supply and delivery of long-range missiles and equipment for which we have evidence that they are used in torture, the export of which we have already banned to any destination. 
 Secondly, we intend to introduce controls on trafficking and brokering between overseas countries of all military and paramilitary equipment the export of which is controlled. That will involve a major expansion of the licensing regime. We believe that it is justified to help prevent the UK being used as a base from which to supply weapons to regions in or on the brink of conflict, while allowing legitimate trade by British defence companies to continue. I assure the hon. Member for Aldershot that whatever his postal arrangements, the dummy orders were available on Wednesday, and my officials were, rightly, in contact with the Defence Manufacturers Association on that day to alert it to that fact, having ensured that Members of Parliament had access to the orders first.

Gerald Howarth: The Minister knows perfectly well what his parliamentary colleagues' arrangements are. The House was not sitting. We were, mostly, in our constituencies. The orders arrived on the Friday, so I got them on the Saturday. I did not have the chance, because I had other commitments over the weekend, to examine them, so the first real chance that I had to do so was yesterday. It is disrespectful to Parliament to present this detailed document of 50 or 60 pages a couple of days before the Committee is due to meet. In respect of the Defence Manufacturers Association, I spoke to the director, General Alan Sharman, and he said that the first that he knew of the matter was when he was alerted to it by my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury. He had to look up the orders on the website. There is clearly a difference of view between the Minister and General Sharman.

Nigel Griffiths: I do not know what the General's internal communication arrangements are, but I can assure the Committee that my information is that the DMA was informed on the day that the orders were published. The hon. Gentleman made a legitimate point about how dense, detailed and complicated the orders are, but that is why we supplied him with advisory notes as well. We hope that they will be helpful in formulating his response and the Opposition response to the orders, as part of the consultation process that I outlined in my initial statement to the Committee.
 I know that in spite of some slight differences, the whole Committee recognises the importance of being able to take action on trafficking and brokering, so I urge the Committee to agree that the clause stand part of the Bill. 
 Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 13, Noes 3.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 5, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mr. Pearson.] 
Adjourned accordingly at twelve minutes to One o'clock till this day at half-past Four o'clock.